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I take my task here as a kind of weaving. I wish to throw the net wide and show how Martin 
Heidegger and Medard Boss have offered me an understanding of the human realm, and its 
grounding in Being, that has intimately informed how I am as a psychotherapist. This human 
realm, between sky and earth, has been communicated by them not just in philosophically 
logical ways, but also in evocatively human ways that may be “held” and embodied. It is in 
this spirit that I wish to use the term “freedom-wound” in order to indicate and evoke what 
I will call the “soulful space” of being human – how we are grounded in both great freedom 
and great vulnerability. Such ambiguity may describe the essence of a human kind of 
openness, and the lived understanding of such ambiguity may be shown to give direction to 
psychotherapy in the following ways: 
 
a) It welcomes psychotherapy clients to the human realm as wound and freedom. 
Such “wound” and “freedom” is not merely historical and social, but is given and 
can be taken up and lived in more welcome ways. There are “wounds” and 
vulnerabilities that can be avoided or can be “healed,” but there is a great 
vulnerability that cannot. There are many freedoms that can be taken away or fought 
for, but there is a great freedom (with its responsibility) that cannot. 
Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy may give deep permission to clients to 
encounter and experience a kind of “settling down” into these dimensions as they 
come through in the unique vicissitudes of their own life, and to take them up and 
live them forward. 
 
b) It understands so-called “psychopathology” as flights and distortions of the 
human freedom to which one is called and also as the forms of refusal to the human 
vulnerabilities and limits that are existentially given. In this respect, one of the ways 
that Heidegger has served us is to indicate the relevance of grounding the 
understanding of human being in a larger ontological context from which he or she 
is not separate. Such non-separation is the ground of a “calling” beyond us yet 
intimate to us, and as such, cannot be fully understood by humanism, cognitivism or 
psychologism. So-called “psychopathology” thus goes beyond psychology to the so-
called “spiritual” and “moral” realms of our response to “callings” that are not just 
“within” our “minds” but are “there” in the mutual arising of Being and beings.  
 
Essentially I wish to speak of “belonging to freedom-wound,” also metaphorized as 
“soulful space,” between sky and earth, embracing ambiguity. But first I will speak of 
“belonging to freedom” and then of “belonging to wound.” So, although the ideas are 
intricately interconnected, I would like to proceed by highlighting these emphases as a way 
of holding them apart in holding them together. I will adopt this artificial device in the 
following way: 
 
a) A focus on freedom. This section considers the kind of no-thing that we are and 
how we objectify and turn self and others into “things.” 
 
b) A focus on vulnerability. This section considers what has been called 
“narcissism” and how we can refuse the call to embrace human vulnerability and 
inter-human vulnerability.  
 
c) Embracing ambiguity: between sky and earth. This section attempts to set out a 
holistic vision of the interconnection between freedom and vulnerability. The shape 
of such “occurring together” of freedom and vulnerability is metaphorized as 
freedom-wound, and alternatively as “soulful space.” 
 
d) Towards the embodiment of a human kind of openness. In this final section, I 
would like to honor Daseinsanalytic understanding as giving direction to therapy and 
encouraging a particular kind of invitational presence for the therapist to embody. I 
would also like to indicate, however, how an increasing focus on the “lived body” 
and “attunement” (which has its seeds in Heidegger and Boss), has nevertheless set 
me off in a direction with a somewhat different emphasis in terms of 
psychotherapeutic practice. This has to do with my increasing concern with the 
notion of a client’s access to his or her “experiencing-before-formulations” and the 
possibilities of client direction “from there.” 
 
 
 
Belonging to Freedom 
 
I would like to begin by quoting Heidegger (2002) from the Zollikon Seminars, the 
publication that documents his encounters with Boss and psychiatry students. In these 
quotations I see the seeds of an ontological freedom that can be taken up ontically as a 
responsibility and task: 
 
“Freedom is to be free and open for being claimed by something.” (p. 217) 
 
“Beings are and are not nothing… (human being’s) distinction and peril consists 
of…being open in manifold ways to beings as beings.” (pp. 74, 75) 
 
In the Zollikon Seminars, Heidegger claims that it is not that he wants to make philosophers 
out of the psychiatry students whom he is addressing, but that he would like them to 
become “attentive to what concerns the human being unavoidably” (p. 115), even though 
this may not be easy to articulate.   
In his encounters with psychiatry students in the seminar series over its ten year 
history, between 1959 and 1969, Heidegger summarizes the essential insights of Being and 
Time, as well as the sense and spirit of his later work. Within this very broad context that 
includes a consideration of spatiality, temporality, intersubjectivity, embodiment and 
language, he speaks in a way that we never lose sight of a “clearing” that makes all things 
possible. Indeed, as he says explicitly: “spatiality and temporality both belong to the clearing” 
(p. 225). In other words, space and time are not “independent variables” into which all 
beings (including human beings) are slotted, but space and time are themselves shaped from 
the events of the clearing in which human existence intimately participates. That spatiality is 
the possible “free and open” into which things can come, that temporality is the possible 
then, now and not yet which carries both continuity and discontinuity, that beings can be 
and body forth, that all things disclose themselves as something and interact in some way;  
through this all, is the clearing which grounds these possibilities, the “something-eventing” 
rather than nothing,” the “is” that includes both the revealed and the concealed and opens 
the possibilities of intimate participation. 
This “clearing” is not human consciousness as in an idealist fantasy of it. Such a 
position would enthrone human existence and human consciousness as the source of all this. 
Nevertheless, human being, as dwelling ecstatically “out there” together with beings and 
participating in the “clearing” carries the essence of the clearing forward in intimate ways. To 
quote Heidegger: “He is not the clearing himself, not the entire clearing, nor is he identical 
to the whole of the clearing as such” (p. 171). Yet human being in his or her essence does 
carry an opening power that is enacted by his or her embodied perceptions and actions. This 
is the essential source of human freedom; not fundamentally in the freedom to choose or to 
act (which is nevertheless part of this freedom), but to be a domain of standing 
perceptually/receptively open to what is encountered, to be the “there” of being (Dasein). 
Why this can be called a kind of freedom is that it gives room to perceptions and 
meanings. It is a kind of freedom that both reveals and conceals, and which co-participates 
in the event of Being. Living on the edge of time, I occur as a gathering and am the “there” 
for the coming together of possibilities and relationships that can be carried forward into the 
aliveness of something new. It should be emphasized that we are speaking here 
ontologically: this kind of freedom is something we are rather than something we decide to 
do or not – it is part of the essence of being human. To quote Askay (2002), “Dasein can 
only be free in the sense of “freedom of choice” because it is primordially exposed to the 
free and open dimension (i.e., the clearing) of being in the first place” (p. 312). Yet this is not 
an absolute freedom, as if everything was inside an individual being’s own personal 
consciousness and as if there was no “otherness.” Falling far short of totality, human 
openness means that it is an openness for…, and this involves an acknowledgement of being 
claimed by the concerns that come with such “otherness” as well as the claims of one’s own 
situated and embodied existence, its relationality, and the “room” that both otherness and 
situated existence needs. So “being there” is also a “being there for” – it is essentially an 
opening that has “care” as its nature. 
Michael Zimmerman (1992), in a paper on ethics and responsibility, articulated how 
freedom is not a human possession. At the ontological level, we “belong” to freedom and 
can ontically take this up and authentically be of service to the task of freedom which is to 
“let beings be.” 
Such given ontological freedom and responsibility to be the “there” can be lived out 
ontically in different ways. There are multiple ways of being the “there” and perceptually 
attuning to otherness, such as in boredom, in anger, in sadness, in desire. In appropriating 
Meister Eckart’s notion of “Gelassenheit” or “letting be-ness,” Heidegger indicated something 
of the care-full possibility of freely standing in a serene welcome that allows beings their 
“otherness” and their own freedom to be. This is the “sky of welcome,” the hospitality of 
home-rooming things and beings that can become themselves more and further.  We will 
return to this ontic possibility of granting freedom based on its ontological foundation when 
we consider one of the dimensions of psychotherapeutic welcome a little later. 
In considering this relationship between the givenness of ontological freedom and 
it’s ontic possibility of being taken up, I would like to move closer to a particular implication 
of the ontic experience of freedom: a freer and more “spacious” sense of personal identity. 
This implication may give insight into one of the central liberating powers of psychotherapy. 
In previous papers (Todres, 1993, 1999a), I have discussed the problem of self-
objectification and its releasement, how we are always more than our contexts. (see also Frie, 
2003 and Zimmerman, 1981).  In not being enclosed upon ourselves, human identity cannot 
be essentially defined in a “thing-like” way. Human identity can never be finally objectified, it 
is essentially no-thing. I will emphasize this dimension just for the moment even though it is 
far from the whole story. But as a counterpoint to a growing technological world-view which 
has found it useful to isolate objects and things, a meditation on our no-thingness may help 
us remember how we may get lost in specialized, objectified views of ourselves. Such 
specialized, objectified views of one’s own identity, if clung to too tightly, may forget the 
“room to move” that the openness of Being has granted us in our essence. In the 
forgetfulness of our primordial belonging, the need to belong does not go away, even if it 
means belonging to some “thing,” some general category, some specialized turning ourselves 
and others into grasped objects. This strategy of objectifying self and other has become 
particularly difficult to sustain in these post-modern times, where the traditional narratives 
do not easily hold their center and where the task of belonging has become an extremely 
complex challenge (Todres, 2002). 
In carrying out a phenomenological study of clients’ experiences of psychotherapy, I 
was interested in focusing on the kind of therapeutic self-insight that carries a greater sense 
of freedom (Todres, 2003). A picture emerged in which the complex story that unfolded 
between therapist and client constituted forms of self and world that were “more than” 
previous self-definitions. This kind of self-insight was characterized as a direction which 
freed self-understanding from the objectification of self and other (Todres, 1999a). One 
generic power of conversational psychotherapy may thus be to help clients recover their 
sense of human identity in ways that always transcend any form of objectification. As such it 
could be a humanizing force within a technological society where the pressure to become 
more specialized, “efficient” and more subject to measurement, has become a powerful 
value and quest. Time does not permit me to go into some of the more detailed descriptions 
of this kind of therapeutic experience that arose from this study. However, I would just like 
to highlight one component of this experience, that is, the nature of the “sense of freedom” 
that occurs. The invariant structure that was intuited was the experience of “being more 
than…” and, us such, of moving beyond previous experiences of self-enclosure: 
 
In the experience of “being more than…”, a self as agent is recovered in 
which there is a potentially transcendent quality beyond a self that is 
reduced to the sum total of its past experiences. On the other hand, such 
freedom is not absolute freedom. The results of the study revealed how 
the terms of the freedom arose out of a consideration of personal limits 
and repetitions. The open space of the freedom only makes sense in 
relation to these limits and restrictions. (Todres, 2003, p. 202) 
 
As a complex historical experience, it is then a situated freedom, and although grounded in 
no-thingness, “works” in relation to the immanence of “this” embodied, historical situation.  
At the end of this analysis, I was prompted to say that the content of particular 
therapeutic self-insights is not the fundamental point of psychotherapy. Rather it is the 
experience of “being more than” or of “being-as-possibility” that is one of the generic 
liberating powers of psychotherapy. 
 
 
Belonging to Wound 
 
In talking of the claim of ontological freedom and the ontic experience of situated 
freedom we have begun to touch on the nature of a “wounded” kind of freedom that forms 
“soulful space,” the human realm between sky and earth. But we have not yet come 
explicitly enough to articulating the existential nature of human vulnerability with its task of 
suffering and sojourning in the human realm and meeting others there. Again I would like to 
start this section with Heidegger (2001): 
 
“Dasein is that being whose being itself is at issue.” (p. 124) 
 
“…being human, as such, is distinguished by the fact that to be, in its own unique (my 
italics) way, is to be this openness.” (p. 121) 
 
There is a question and a certain quality of aloneness in this. Just as a great freedom and 
responsibility is given with human being’s intimate participation in the clearing, there is a 
profound vulnerability that is given with human existence. The source of vulnerability 
paradoxically “comes from” human being’s openness to the world to receive-perceive. And 
Heidegger has characterized this as “care.” Zimmerman (1992) elaborates as follows: “By 
defining the being of Dasein as care (Sorge), Heidegger emphasized that human existence is 
essentially concerned about itself, other people, and things in the world” (p. 60). 
It is as if each of us is formed as a passionate question, an incompleteness that lives 
with us and to which we respond. This “care” is incarnate in our flesh and shapes the ways 
that things come to us. 
This is the “wound of earth,” of walking this path rather than that path, of loss and 
the possibility of not-being, of physical pain and the pain of not being at home, of being 
thrown into this circumstance, culture and time, of being situated and defined by self, body, 
others, language and culture.   
In living a human life we come with the seasons, with dryness and wetness, with the 
rhythms of darkness and light, of going away and coming back, of continuities and great 
discontinuities, with its Janus-face of both potential anguish and renewal. Framing and 
permeating this all is finitude; there, in the possibility of not being, and there, in the fragility 
of flowers, in the beauty of a sunset and in the passing of a smile.  
I want to say that the essence of all this speaks of an existential vulnerability that is 
the foundation of its specific circumstances. And this is the “wound” of human openness 
that grounds the experience of vulnerability. The very nature of the human sojourn carries 
an inevitable question: how to live with the implications of this wound that speaks of an 
unfinished self that cannot be irrevocably grasped, that speaks of temporal uncertainty, and 
that speaks of falling from the oneness of belonging? It is far better to try to deny such 
vulnerability; to embark on a voyage of great refusal. And here we come to narcissism.   
“Narcissism” as a technical term within the field of psychopathology has been 
characterized as a whole style of being-in-the-world that tries to defend against the great 
vulnerability of feeling needy and incomplete. Something of the understanding of such a 
possibility for living can be indicated with reference to the myth of Narcissus. Essentially, a 
beautiful young man becomes fixated and fascinated by an illusion: that his image in a pool 
of water can be grasped and possessed. He becomes enamored of this surface image of 
himself to the exclusion of all other possible relationships. The core quest is to become at 
one with the beautiful picture. This story can be taken as a metaphorical indication of trying 
to avoid the vulnerability that comes with openness and relationality by pursuing a quest that 
tries to live as if it were possible to be in control of the source of “otherness.” Like all of us, 
Narcissus finds himself in the human realm feeling a sense of disconnection from an 
absolute guarantee of “nourishment” and continuity. This is a state of vulnerable longing, of 
being in need, of feeling the ways we are not complete. To quote Perikles Kastrinidis (1998, 
p. 179): “To be human means to be torn.” So Narcissus embarks on the journey of great 
refusal. By binding himself to himself, he attempts to “puff up” and maintain forms of self-
sufficiency that strain against the spoiling of such self-sufficiency. 
The psychoanalytic tradition has been helpful in considering a number of strategies 
of living that are implicated in the narcissistic journey. These include trying to turn the “self” 
into something “objective” that can be held onto, into a beautiful “thing” that is stable and 
admired, or into an ideal fantasy that is “above it all;” of seeking others as “mirrors” of one’s 
wholeness and completeness, or of “merging” or identifying with another or group who 
seems fixed, strong, ideal or special. With different emphases and nuances, these 
psychoanalytic writers have indicated the different strategies of self-sufficiency: how to deny 
the acknowledgement of aging and death, how to pretend to be in the stance of “I don’t 
need.” In these ways the flight from openness, relationality and vulnerability are pursued. 
The futility of this quest as an absolute possibility is finally indicated in Narcissus’s mood of 
despair in which, in one version of the story, he kills himself. 
The story also implies a different possibility, the existential task of embodying 
openness and vulnerability, the possibility of bearing this wound and even finding it as a gate 
and passage to that which is humanly possible and which I will metaphorize as “soulful 
space,” the intertwining of freedom and vulnerability. But before that, I would like to 
indicate the gift of “belonging to wound.” 
This gift involves what Eugene Gendlin (1997a) calls the “life forward direction” 
which may require an openness to what may come in vulnerability. In this vulnerable 
openness there is a leaning towards the life that is not yet, and the “newness” of being 
touched by an aliveness that always includes the possibility of pain. So we are accompanied 
on our sojourn by this vulnerability that knows the softness of flesh and the joy of 
welcoming the one who returns. This “hunger” for what may come is not just towards the 
past, as if to be at one with a mother at the beginning, but rather a leaning into the matrix-
not-yet, the freshness of what presents itself. In the flow of relational life there may be a 
nourishment of the play of home and adventure, the gift of belonging to wound. So there is 
an existential wound that one can bear, that remains open and does not contract into self-
enclosure. The one from home is transformed by this adventure and such a “self” is never 
self-enclosed but is always in the openness of relationships. 
So we come back to freedom and towards the intertwining of freedom and wound in 
soulful space; the freedom of being incomplete; the nourishing brightness that can come in 
such unknowing, carrying with it the possible tenderness of the human space of welcome. 
 
 
Belonging to Freedom-wound: Embracing Ambiguity in “Soulful Space” 
 
 Belonging to freedom-wound, we are intimate with “being-in” and “being-with.” In 
these terms, the openness of Being is not forgotten and the nature of such openness is in its 
“withness” and in its “in-the-worldness.” This may be taken together with Heidegger’s 
(2001) earlier quote that: “Beings are and are not nothing…” (p. 74). Heidegger is indicating 
a “being-open” that is never separate from “being open for…”, the claims of one’s unique 
situatedness. A further and more explicit quote from Heidegger (2001) takes this further: 
“Now how is it with consciousness? To stand in the clearing, yet not standing like a pole, but 
rather to sojourn in the clearing and be occupied with things” (p. 225). 
 Belonging to freedom-wound can translate into the ontic capacity to welcome 
historical incompleteness and human vulnerability. Ongoing participation rather than the 
survival of a “fixed” self can become welcome. In such free participation one is changed in 
the participation, and thus one “wears” the freedom to be vulnerable in an existential way.  
The mood of this is not just a serene “letting be-ness,” but rather the moods of being moved 
and touched in many different ways at different times, the gift of wound. Through these 
moods and multiplicities there may also be the poignant taste of being willing to be the 
“there,” to be hospitable, and to be a unique place of gathering for a new “showing” of 
historical event-ing (Richardson, 2002). We could also put it this way: the recovery of our 
no-thingness paradoxically empowers the freedom to be someone-in-particular and 
incomplete.  
 To bear and take up the marks of finitude in our own carrying forward, and the 
marks of another in our sojourn, brings us most fully to the characterization of “soulful 
space.”  
 In being “more than” any way we objectify ourselves and in being “more than” any 
way our contexts objectify us, there may be a sense of great space and freedom. At its edge 
may be Bodhidharma’s “vast space, nothing holy.” However, this is not the same as the 
more complex phenomenon I wish to call “soulful space.” It is possible to become too 
enamored with “free presence” and the resolution of human vulnerability into vastness.  
 “Soulful space” takes its essence in human participation and historical relationality. 
Intimately within this sojourn, there is a mixing of “what one goes through” alone and with 
others, the stretching of the seasons, and the specific vulnerabilities that are more complex 
than a “serenity” of vastness. Rather, this is the taste of belonging between sky and earth, the 
“we-feeling” of mutual vulnerability.  
 In living forward we carry the given freedom of “more than” any objectification of 
ourselves and others, and in living forward we carry the given vulnerabilities of situatedness 
and finitude. We are able to say “givenness” because we do not start with beings, but with 
the grounding of beings in Being. Such belonging to freedom-wound provides the possibility 
of an intersubjectivity that grants both freedom and empathy; a “soulful space” where we 
can deeply meet fellow carriers of freedom-wound.  
 This is the human realm that is possible, that which Narcissus would reject. This is 
the ambiguous space (Sallis, 1973) that asks for both intimacy and aloneness, self-assertion 
and love, productivity and play, home and adventure; an ambiguity that forms a deep 
motivation and creative tension in the human heart. Within this context, so-called 
“psychopathology” can be understood as a flight from the openness of freedom and the 
refusal of such vulnerability. And here we finally come to the practice of Daseinsanalytically-
oriented psychotherapy. 
 
 
Towards an Embodiment of Human Openness 
 
A question that now arises: how may a Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy be 
informed by a lived understanding of “belonging to freedom-wound”?  
 Heidegger traces the Greek roots of the word “analysis” to also mean “to loosen.” 
And this implies bindings. In this regard he has referred to metaphors of “unravelling a 
woven fabric.” One could say that conversational psychotherapy in general addresses the 
repetitions and premature ways that we have defined ourselves and others. But more 
distinctively, the analysis of human being’s relation to Being as belonging to freedom-wound, 
places Daseinsanalytically-oriented psychotherapy within an ethical context and conscience 
that is “there,” beyond the relation between drives and society. This “calling” is something 
Boss was very attentive to. He used it as a basis from which to understand psychopathology 
and as a basis from which to characterize the Daseinsanalyst’s essential activity. I would like 
to briefly acknowledge these two contributions before moving on to my own increasing 
emphasis on the “callings” of the lived body. 
 
 
a) Psychopathology as Truncated Existential Possibilities 
 
 Condrau (1986) has characterized the essential question in relation to illness as: “How 
is a person’s freedom to carry out his potentialities impaired at any given time; what are these 
potentialities; and with respect to which entities does this impairment occur?” (p. 69) By 
means of italics Condrau emphasizes the words “how,” “what” “at any given time” and 
“which” potentials. Thus, contained within this understanding of illness is how it is in 
relation to living forward, its context and meaning. One may say: “so far, so psychoanalytic.” 
But note that he is not as interested in the “why” question – for him, a focus on “why” is 
speculative, philosophically unsustainable, and may obscure the phenomenological presence 
to, and description of, the specific potentialities that cannot be carried out. 
It is in this spirit that Boss, his colleagues and students have studied and articulated 
the particular existential potentials that are truncated in different pathological forms. I 
cannot do justice here to these descriptions that have been pursued amongst other places in 
Boss’s books: The Content and Meaning of Sexual Perversions (1949), Psychoanalysis and 
Daseinsanalysis (1963), and Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology (1979). Suffice it to 
say that such a “seeing” of specific existential potentials gives the “illness” a direction and 
“calling.” For example, Boss could recognize in the case of a sadistic pervert, the extremely 
frustrated desire to be at one with a lover, where the patient could only express the wish to 
devour and own (Boss, 1963, pp. 186-208). And here we come to the second important 
contribution, a contribution to practice: 
 
 
b)   Anticipatory Care and the Invitational Presence to “Let Be” 
 
 Boss saw in Freud’s “free association” the seeds of a practice that could be re-framed 
within a deeper existential context. Initially, he was not as interested as Buber or the object-
relations theorists in the phenomenon of interpersonal encounter in itself as the major focus 
for therapeutic activity. Building on Heidegger’s notions of “anticipatory care” and “letting 
be-ness,” he wished to invite patients to become more “open to” what addressed them as 
they dwelt with, and attended to, their experiencing. He understood how such 
“experiencing” was not “inside” and separate from the world, but always in the relational 
presence of the potential callings and claims of being-there, between sky and earth. In 
anticipatory care he thus had great faith that if he turned patients back towards “themselves” 
rather than towards him, the relation between Being and beings could begin to do its work 
of restoring existential possibility and the re-membering of belonging to freedom-wound. 
The direction “comes from there” and he deeply welcomes and gives permission to this 
possibility, even encouraging this direction by means of his “why not” question. The 
therapist’s attention in this mode is thus a listening for the healthy potential that is implicit. 
Such an attention is embodied in a certain kind of invitational presence and raises the 
question: how is it possible, accompanied by a lived understanding of freedom-wound, to 
represent such callings in a way that a client can authentically integrate them and to take 
them up as her own? And here we come to a direction for practice that I have personally 
increasingly pursued with greater emphases, that of the “lived body” as a primordial form of 
participative knowing in all this. 
 
 
Therapist as Experiential Guide and Existential Companion 
 
 I am increasingly interested in what I would call experiential-existential 
psychotherapy. In my view, this focuses essentially on two things. Firstly, the therapist’s own 
existential presence to “freedom-wound” that allows her or him to be a place of welcome 
and permission. And secondly, the therapist’s ability to honor and facilitate the client’s 
experiential process, moment by moment, as it is engaged in attending to the growing edges 
of her or his experiencing. It is with this latter concern that I have considered the notion of 
attunement, the lived body, and how experiencing becomes open to a vast range of implicit 
meanings and callings that move within our bodily relation to self-world-happening; and 
how language can serve such opening and appropriation. 
 This is a large subject and I would just like to indicate the central import of Eugene 
Gendlin’s philosophy of implicit entry for psychotherapy. Let me start with Heidegger and 
my sense of how, at times, he stood in the mystery of Being: the extent to which self was 
open, the extent to which he grounded the “said” in the “unsaid,” how being-in-the-world 
always transcended its forms and intrinsically exceeded linguistic capture.  To quote 
Heidegger, “What is sayable receives its determination from what is not sayable” (1975, p. 
78). And I come from there to Gendlin, perhaps through Merleau-Ponty, and say that the 
lived body, as shepherd of participation, and as a relationship of belonging to being-in-the-
world, provides forms of relational knowing of how callings and meanings first come to us.  
 Faithful to the depth of bodily relational understandings, we could say that the way 
we are bodily in situations exceeds any precise formulation or patterning of it. This place of 
excess is where meanings can be felt before they are thought. Such a “felt sense” indicates a 
pre-reflective understanding of one’s specific experience that functions intelligibly. Gendlin’s 
notion of attending to a “felt-sense” that is bodily grounded, builds on Heidegger’s 
understanding of how emotional attunement opens the world in different ways. But Gendlin 
notes that the “felt sense” can include but is “more than” than emotional attunement. For 
example, you may wish to sense into an experience that you had of a hot summer’s night, 
just being in that. This whole experience is carried by the body and is “more” than the heat, 
“more” than the emotion of it, “more” than who you were with, “more” than other personal 
times and places that resonate with the hot, summer’s night. All this is implicated in it and 
very specific. Gendlin (1992) has referred to this as an “unseparated multiplicity,” in which 
the lived body functions as the background knowing of a situation-for-one-as-a-whole 
before lifting out or formulating its distinctions. He wants to remind us how the body is 
intimately implicated in what things mean, in that we live our relation to meanings through 
bodily participation in the world. 
Heidegger is indicating something similar when he writes of Befindlichkeit as 
“locating” or “finding-oneself-in-relation.” And interestingly, focusing on and languaging the 
possible distinctions within “the more”, that is given by the felt-sense, can change and “carry 
forward” the “more” in productive ways. So moving existentially is both an embodied and 
languaged process. It is this bodily sense of what we “carry” that pre-figures our capacity to 
be open to the tasks of “being-there” as freedom-wound; it is both a receptive-perceptual as 
well as an emotional capacity, and the lived body carries its spatial and temporal shapes.  
 Also, such experiential entry into one’s own location is a continuity with contextual 
potentials that “come from” the relational vastness of being-in-the-world. Who knows how 
far this goes? Yet such gatherings are very specific. To quote Gendlin: “Whenever we enter 
the experiencing of anything that is being talked about, we immediately find an intricacy with 
vast resources that goes beyond the existing public language” (Gendlin, 1997b, p. 37). So this 
kind of “locational dwelling” and “self finding” presents both our “carried” relatively fixed 
meanings as well as the implicit “moreness” from where fresh living-as-possibility and living-
as-letting-be-ness can be constituted – “freedom-wound.” The essence of deep 
psychotherapeutic change is then in the client’s growing trust that is two-fold. Firstly, 
through experience that s/he can be productively informed and nourished by her or his 
matrix, that which is given with the lived body’s capacity for a recollection of being: home. 
Secondly, through the experiencing of his or her capacity to take up and “live forward” new 
meanings, fresh perceptions and engagements: adventure. It is then no wonder that depth 
psychology has concentrated so much on “mother” and “father.” The increasing trust of an 
unmediated belonging to home and adventure empowers a sojourn that enters the 
complexity of “soulful space,” between sky and earth. Experiential-existential psychotherapy 
then holds fast onto the understanding that although one cannot walk for another, 
accompaniment is both possible and helpful. 
 While Boss took Heidegger’s existential of “bodying forth” into the specific arena of 
psychosomatic medicine – how meanings may be lived or truncated – he may not have 
focused sufficiently on the implications of the lived body’s attunement for psychotherapeutic 
practice. 
 In my view, Gendlin provides a practice that emphasizes an experiential knowing, a 
knowing by virtue of being, an intimate inhabiting, an “embodying of the presence of things 
that is pregnant with meaning” (Ferrer, 2002, p. 122). To put this another way, bodily 
experiencing is the place where the presence of “more than orderly patterns” of what comes 
can gather. Such bodily-mediated intricacy is greater than conceptualization.  So, how to 
protect and facilitate this “fertility” and “generativity”? This is what Gendlin has been 
concerned with – how to honor and give phenomenological respect to the lived process by 
which languaging and embodying interact. 
We are only on the way towards understanding the nature of the invitation to clients 
to bodily dwell with pre-separated multiplicity, to be the practitioners themselves of “how” 
they find words which carry forward presence, and of how therapists embody and language 
such service.  For the therapist to be both a guide and a companion; this may be the 
challenge. 
I would like to end with some words from Leonard Cohen (2001), who for me 
invokes one of the moods of “soulful space.” It is from a song called “Here it is,” and the 
luxury of it is that I don’t even need to sing: 
 
Here is your sickness. 
Your bed and your pan; 
And here is your love 
For the woman, the man. 
 
May everyone live, 
And may everyone die. 
Hello, my love,  
And my love, goodbye. 
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